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27 October 1949

DATE 2007

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828 NAZIWAR CRIMES BISCLOSURE ACT

MEMORANDUM FOR: COP

VIA:

CPP

SUBJECT:

BGFIEND

REFERENCE:

OPC Cable (Outgoing #91859) of 20 October 1949

1. Paragraph 3 of the reference cable informs and that three BC 610 short-wave transmitters are being procured for installation on the propaganda boat.

- 2. The use of short-wave transmitters in this operation is questionable for the following reasons:
 - a. Our assumption, based on the best available information, has been that broadcasts would have to be medium-wave to reach the largest audience in Albania. We have proposed that broadcasts from the boat be channeled on radio Tirana's wave-length (medium-wave) with a signal strong enough to overpower Tirana.
 - b. We believe that most short-wave receivers are in the hands of the Hoxha clique. Broadcasts heard by this group would probably get little if any word-of-mouth circulation.
- 3. We understand that the decision to use short-wave transmitters was partly based on British reports of more short-wave receivers in Albania than we had assumed. We have not seen conformatory evidence.

Another consideration involved in the decision apparently was the difficulty of procuring a craft big enough to carry medium-wave broadcasting equipment close enough to Albania's shores.

- 4. PB II feels that the present short-wave broadcasting arrangements will not be effective, and therefore, makes the following proposals:
 - a. The British should be requested to submit to us a detailed statement on the number and distribution of

short-wave

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short-wave receivers in Albania, and their opinion of the possible effectiveness of short-wave broadcasts. If the facts are convincing, PB II will, of course, withdraw its objections.

- b. COP should procure a suitable craft to carry medium-wave broadcasting equipment into Albanian waters. FB I (Commander Smith) stated that although this would be feasible, it would entail considerable expense and effort. PB II feels that this craft will be of utmost importance for BGFIEND and could also be of later use in such areas as Bulgaria, Southeast Asia, and possibly the Far East. Until this craft has been procured, interim short-wave broadcasts could be made from the present propaganda boat.
- c. Action upon proposal b should await the information requested in proposal a.